A proper implementation of DEHP would render an attacker to search for private parameters amongst the exponentially many solutions. However, an improper implementation would provide an attacker exponentially many choices to solve the DEHP. The AA β -cryptosystem is an asymmetric cryptographic scheme that utilizes this concept together with the factorization problem of two large primes and is implemented only by using the multiplication operation for both encryption and decryption. With this simple mathematical structure, it would have low computational requirements and would enable communication devices with low computing power to deploy secure communication procedures efficiently.
Introduction
The discrete log problem (DLP) and the elliptic curve discrete log problem (ECDLP) has been the source of security for cryptographic schemes such as the Diffie Hellman key exchange procedure, El-Gamal cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) respectively [6] , [10] . As for the world renowned RSA cryptosystem, the inability to find the e-th root of the ciphertext C modulo N from the congruence relation C ≡ M e (mod N) coupled with the inability to factor N = pq for large primes p and q is its fundamental source of security [11] . Recently, suggestions have been made that the ECC is able to produce the same level of security as the RSA with shorter key length. Thus, ECC should be the preferred asymmetric cryptosystem when compared to RSA [16] . Hence, the notion "cryptographic efficiency" is conjured. That is, to produce an asymmetric cryptographic scheme that could produce security equivalent to a certain key length of the traditional RSA but utilizing shorter keys. However, in certain situations where a large block needs to be encrypted, RSA is the better option than ECC because ECC would need more computational effort to undergo such a task [14] . Thus, adding another characteristic toward the notion of "cryptographic efficiency" which is it must be less "computational intensive". As such, in order to design a state-of-the-art public key mechanism, the above two characteristics must be adhered to apart from other well known security issues. In 1998 the cryptographic scheme known as NTRU was proposed with better "cryptographic efficiency" relative to RSA and ECC [9] . Much effort has been done to push NTRU to the forefront [8] .
The cryptographic scheme in this paper is based on what is defined as the Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (DEHP). It is coupled together with the well known integer factorization problem of two large primes. The DEHP is a new form of cryptographic problem based on the Diophantine equation of the form
V i x i . The authors propose that the DEHP as outlined in this paper is also another cryptographic problem that has secure cryptographic qualities coupled with the above described "cryptographic efficiency" qualities.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (DEHP) will be described. The mechanism of the AA β -cryptosystem will be detailed in Section 3. Continuing in Section 4, will be discussion on the security features of this cryptosystem. In Section 5 lattice based attacks on the scheme is discussed. Section 6 will be devoted in discussing the consequences of improper design utilizing the DEHP. That is, the possibility of succumbing to a passive adversary attack. The underlying principle and reduction proofs regarding the intractability of the scheme is proposed in Section 7. A numerical example of the scheme as well as an illustration of the DEHP will also be given in this section. Finally, we conclude the paper by comparing "cryptographic efficiency" characteristics against RSA,ECC and NTRU schemes in Section 8.
The Diophantine equation hard problem (DEHP)
The DEHP is based upon the linear diophantine equation which is of the form
V i x i . The following definitions would give a precise idea regarding the DEHP. Example 1. Let x 1 = 6143959510671614040, x 2 = 6143959507200090613 be the preferred solutions for the equation 12287919017871704653 = x 1 + x 2 where x 1 and x 2 are 2n-bits long (i.e. this example n = 32). An attacker would be faced with the AA β -DEHP-2 (see Section 7) of determining the preferred integer x 1 = t in order to determine the remaining preferred integer x 2 = 12287919017871704653 − t that form the prf -solution set for the above Diophantine equation. Since it is known that x 1 is 64-bits long, the possible values of t resides within the interval (2 63 , 2 64 −1). In other words, there are 2 64 possible values that x 1 might be.
3 The AA β -Cryptosystem
We will now define parameters needed for the renewed AA β -cryptosystem. The communication model is between two parties A (Along) and B (Busu). 
and
where v is 0.8125n-bits long.
Definition 5. Let p and q be two prime numbers of n-bit length. Along's public keys are given by
Definition 6. Along's private key is given by 
Proof. We begin with:
because m < d A2 .
The AA β -public key cryptography scheme
We will now discuss the AA β -cryptosystem. It is as follows: the scenario is that Busu will send an encrypted message to Along. Along will provide Busu with his public key pair e A1 and e A2 . Busu intends to send the integer plaintext P = m as in Definition 8. Busu will then proceed to generate the ciphertext C. Then Busu transmits the ciphertext C to Along. Upon receiving the ciphertext from Busu, Along by Proposition 1, can retrieve the integer plaintext P = m.
Security Features
In this section we will focus on the obvious objective of an attacker. That is to retrieve the plaintext or the private key or both. Discussion would begin by discussing the objective of trying to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext followed by the objective to obtain the private key embedded within the public key.
To obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext
As defined in Definition 9, the plaintext resides within C. Thus, the attacker has to prf -solve C via the preferred integers k 1 and k 2 the AA β -DEHP-1 (see Section 7) given by
The ability to determine the keys k 1 or k 2 would infer that the attacker has also the ability to determine m in the first instance.
To obtain the private key from the public key via the Diophantine equations
The attacker has to prf -solve e A1 and e A2 via the preferred integers a 1 , a 2 and a 3 the AA β -DEHP-2 (see Section 7). In congruent with the ability to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext as discussed above, the ability to determine the keys a 1 , a 2 and a 3 would infer that the attacker has also the ability to determine m in the first instance.
Lattice based attacks
In this section we put forward two possible attacks via lattices and show that why such attacks will not yield any information detrimental to the scheme.
Attack with Coppersmith method in the univariate case
We will reproduce Coppersmith's theorem for the benfit of the reader. 
Gaussian heuristic
We will look at the the lattice L spanned by (1, 0, e1), (0, 1, e2), (0, 0, C). Observe that the vector V = (k1, k2, −m) is in L. If V is short, then the LLL algorithm will be able to detect V . This is critical since by the usage of the vector V = (k1, k2, −m) it is obvious that the length of m is dominant when compared to k1 and k2 hence length of V is approximately m. And by the above information m is certainly dominant in the vector V=(k1,k2,-m). Now let us check whether V is really short or not. The Gaussian heuristic for the lattice L is given by:
One can see that σ(L) is approximately ( 2n 3 )-bits, while the length of the vector V is ( 4n 5 )-bits. The Gaussian heuristic is much smaller than the length of the vector V . Thus, the vector V is not considered to be short and cannot be detected by the LLL algorithm.
Improper design via the DEHP
It is important to note that, an improper design of an asymmetric cryptosystem via the DEHP would lead to succesful passive adversary attacks. To illustrate this fact, we will produce the following two examples.
A key exchange mechanism based on the DEHP
Let Along and Busu utilize private 2 X 2 non-singular matrices A and B respectively. A base generator G will be made public. It is a 2 X 2 singular matrix.
The parameter E A = AG and E B = GB will be exchanged between Along and Busu. Then Along will compute EAB = [A]E B , while Busu will compute EBA = E A [B]. Now both parties have the same key (i.e. key exchange). If the assumption is that the attacker has to obtain either A or B from either E A or E B this would be the DEHP, since G is singular. However, an attacker could still compute A ′ = A but A ′ G = AG and as a result is able to compute A ′ E B = EAB. Thus rendering the scheme insecure. The following is a numerical example. An attacker intercepting E A could construct the matrix
It could be observed that AGB = A ′ GB. Hence, a passive adversary attack has been successfully executed.
Improper integer size
Observe the equation given by
where e A and g 1 are public parameters. Let g 1 be of length 2n-bits, while the private parameters a 1 and a 2 are n-bits long.Because of this improper choice of size, one can obtain
7 The Underlying Security Principle
We will now observe the underlying security principles that the AA β -cryptosystem is based upon.
7.1
The AA β -DEHP-1
Determine the preferred integer either (k 1 or k 2 ) such that m = C−k 1 e A1 (mod e A2 ) or m = C − k 2 e A2 (mod e A1 ).
The AA β -DEHP-2
Determine the preferred integers (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) belonging to the public keys e A1 and e A2 .
The integer factorization problem
Let p and q be two large primes. From e A1 = a 1 + a 2 = pq obtain d A1 = p.
Security reduction
Proposition 2. AA β -DEHP-2 ≡ T Factoring e A1 = pq.
Proof. Let θ 1 be an oracle that factors the product of primes. Call θ 1 (e A1 ) to obtain p and q. Then we are able to construct a 1 = p(q+1) 2
, a 2 = p(q−1) 2 and a 3 = e A2 − a 1 . Hence, the preferred integers (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) are obtained Thus, AA β -DEHP-2 ≤ T Factoring e A1 = pq. Let θ 2 be an oracle that obtains the preferred integers (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) . Then obtain p = a 1 − a 2 and eA1 p = q. Thus, Factoring e A1 = pq ≤ T AA β -DEHP-2. Hence, AA β -DEHP-2 ≡ T Factoring e A1 = pq.
Proposition 3. Decryption ≤ T Factoring e A1 = pq.
Proof. Let θ 1 be an oracle that factors the product of primes. Call θ 1 (e A1 ) to obtain p and q. Then determine v ≡ e A2 ( modp). Now, decryption can occur. Proof. The AA β public key cryptosystem is a probabilistic cryptosystem. A probabilitic encryption scheme is IND-CPA [16] . Thus the AA β public key cryptosystem is IND-CPA.
Example
We will now provide a clear numerical illustration of the AA β -cryptosystem for n = 32-bits. Along will generate the following secret keys: a 1 = 6143959510671614040, a 2 = 6143959507200090613, a 3 = 5113460585870913605 and v = 66857602. Along's public keys are e A1 = 12287919017871704653 and e A2 = 11257420096542527645.
Observe that e A1 is product of two 32-bit primes (p = 3471523427 and q = 3539633039). Along's private keys are d A1 = 3471523427 and d A2 = 66857602. In the meantime Busu will generate k 1 = 33 and k 2 = 32. The message is M = 39152991. The ciphertext generated by Busu is C = 765738770679166291180. Finally, (C(mod d A1 ))(mod d A2 ) = 39152991.
Conclusion
The AA β -cryptosystem has the capacity to become a novel public key cryptosystem whose hard mathematical problem is based upon the difficulty of the DEHP and the integer factorization problem of two large primes. Just like the RSA, where the e-th root problem is considered much more difficult than factoring the product of primes, the DEHP could also be considered much more difficult than factoring the product of primes (due to the exponential number of possibilities for the private parameters). The minimum key length for optimum security should be set to n = 512-bits. On another note, it is known that the implementation of RSA and ECC is O(n 3 ) operations where n is the length of the message block [5] , [8] One can also note another advantage. That is, since encrypt and decrypt procedures are the basic arithmetic operation of multiplication, the scheme could encrypt messages of large block size with ease. As a result this algorithm is advantageous relative to RSA or ECC (because of better speed) and ECC (because of less computational effort to encrypt/decrypt messages of large block size).
